User Management Interfaces for Earth Observation Services

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i. Preface

This document explains how user and identity management information is included in the protocol specifications for EO (Earth Observation) services, for example catalogue access (OGC 06-131), ordering (OGC 06-141) and programming (OGC 07-018).

The document was initially produced during the ESA HMA (Heterogeneous Missions Accessibility) project and refined during the FEDEO (Federated Earth Observation) Pilot. It was further refined in the ESA EODAIL and HMA-T projects.

This document is not a new specification, however, it describes how existing specifications from W3C and OASIS can be used in combination to pass identity information to Web services some of which are based on OGC Best Practice specifications.

ii. Submitting organisations

The following organisations will submit the original document or its revisions to the OGC™ Security Working Group.

- Spacebel s.a.
- ESA – European Space Agency
- Intecs

The editors would like to acknowledge that this work is the result of collaboration and review of many organisations and would like to thank for the comments and contributions from:

- Astrium
- Spot Image
- ASI
- CNES
- DLR
- Eumetsat
- EUSC
- MDA
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v. Future work

The standardisation of federating IdP and authenticate operation, using the concepts of WS-Trust [NR23], is under investigation for a future version of the present interface. The evolution should include the introduction of a Security Token Service (STS), providing a RequestSecurityToken operation (RST) and delivering the SAML token in a RequestSecurityTokenResponse (RSTR) element. These should replace the
authenticate request and authenticate response, respectively. The RST should use UsernameToken profile from WS-Security [NR24] to convey credentials data. This is essentially a standardisation of interface, without impact on the rest of the system; this should remove the need to define a specific WSDL for the authentication operation.

The ability to have multiple federating entities is also under investigation.

vi. Foreword

This document, through its implementation profile, references several external standards and specifications as dependencies. These are indicated in section 3.1.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. The Open GIS Consortium, Inc. shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
Introduction

This specification is complementary to a set of specifications that describe services for managing Earth Observation (EO) data products. These services include collection level, and product level catalogues, online-ordering for existing and future products, on-line access to these products, etc. The application of the current specification is not limited to the Earth Observation domain however.

The intent of this specification is to describe an identity management interface that can be supported by many data providers (satellite operators, data distributors …), most of whom have existing (and relatively complex) facilities for the management of their data and users. The strategy is to specify a platform and provider independent interface using existing standards.

1 Scope

This proposed interface document describes the interfaces required to authenticate and authorise users in a federated system of Earth Observation services.

2 Conformance

2.1 Conformance to base specifications

This present section covers the compliance testing of an implementation candidate with the present document.

It is worth highlighting that the present OGC document puts together specifications (SAML, WS Security, XACML) that come from other organizational bodies (OASIS) for which the concept of “conformance testing” does not apply; consequently, it is not possible to recursively testing the conformance to the compound specifications.

2.2 Conformance classes

We assume that a unique “core” conformance class encompassing all of the specification clauses of the document is defined and assume that the “Abstract Test Suite” is made up of this unique conformance class (“the core”). This class defines test cases, which covers:

- Test Module Basic requirements
- Test Module Authorization

These are detailed in the Abstract Test Suite (see Annex A).
3 References

3.1 Normative references


[NR7] WSDL, Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1, http://www.w3.org/TR/wsd1

[NR8] IETF RFC 2119, Keywords for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, http://rfc.net/rfc2119.html


[NR17] XML encryption http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/

[NR18] XML signature http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/


3.2 Other references

None
4 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply:

4.1. Authentication [NR14]
To confirm a system entity’s asserted principal identity with a specified, or understood, level of confidence.

4.2. circle of trust
A federation of Service Providers and identity providers within which Service Providers accept the authentication asserted by the identity provider.

4.3. client
software component that can invoke an operation from a server

4.4. external entity
This is the entity owning a protected Web service federated by the Federating Entity. The external entity can be both an identity provider and Service Provider. There can be many external entities.

4.5. federated identity [NR14]
A principal’s identity is said to be federated between a set of Providers when there is an agreement between the providers on a set of identifiers and/or attributes to use to refer to the Principal.

4.6. Federating Entity
This is the entity performing the federation of the identities. The authentication request always passes through the Federating Entity. The Federating Entity can be both identity provider and Service Provider. The present specification assumes that there is only one Federating Entity.

4.7. identifier
a character string that may be composed of numbers and characters that is exchanged between the client and the server with respect to a specific identity of a resource

4.8. identity provider [NR14]
A kind of Service Provider that creates, maintains, and manages identity information for principals and provides principal authentication to other Service Providers within a federation, such as with Web browser profiles.
4.9. **interface**
named set of operations that characterise the behaviour of an entity [ISO 19119]

4.10. **operation**
specification of a transformation or query that an object may be called to execute [ISO 19119]

4.11. **parameter**
variable whose name and value are included in an operation **request** or **response**

4.12. **PEP**
Policy Enforcement Point.

4.13. **principal [NR14]**
A system entity whose identity can be authenticated.

4.14. **request**
invocation of an **operation** by a **client**

4.15. **response**
result of an **operation**, returned from a **server** to a **client**

4.16. **server**
**service instance**
a particular instance of a **service** [ISO 19119]

4.17. **service**
distinct part of the functionality that is provided by an entity through interfaces [ISO 19119]

capability which a Service Provider entity makes available to a service user entity at the interface between those entities [ISO 19104 terms repository]

4.18. **service interface**
shared boundary between an automated system or human being and another automated system or human being [ISO 19101]

4.19. **Service Provider [NR14]**
A role donned by a system entity where the system entity provides services to principals or other system entities.
4.20. transfer protocol
common set of rules for defining interactions between distributed systems [ISO 19118]

5 Symbols and abbreviations

5.1 Symbols (and abbreviated terms)
Some frequently used abbreviated terms:

ATS Abstract Test Suite
BPEL Business Process Execution Language
DAIL Data Access Integration Layer
EO Earth Observation
ETS Executable Test Suite
HMA Heterogeneous Missions Accessibility
HTTP HyperText Transport Protocol
IdP Identity Provider
ISO International Organisation for Standardisation
OASIS Advancing Open Standards for the Information Society
OGC Open Geospatial Consortium
PDP Policy Decision Point
PEP Policy Enforcement Point
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SP Service Provider
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
URN Uniform Resource Name
WSDL Web Service Definition Language
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
XML eXtensible Markup Language
5.2 Document terms and definitions

This document uses the specification terms defined in Subclause 5.3 of [NR16].

6 System context

This section documents special requirements and describes the context of use.

6.1 Application domain

Web service requests are received by Service Providers. These Service Providers should be able to identify who issued the request and react accordingly. The following approach is proposed:

1) An authentication Web service (accepting a user identifier, password and optionally his identity provider) returns a SAML token which authenticates the user to the client (i.e. Web service consumer). (This authentication Web service may federate the identity to another identity provider for authentication. At the interface context this is transparent, the federated identity request being identical to the initial request.)

2) Each subsequent service request by the client (Web service consumer) should include the SAML token in the SOAP header as described later in this document.

3) Each Service Provider accepts service requests only via an Authorisation Service or "Policy Enforcement Point" (PEP). The PEP first checks the existence of SAML token and decrypts it.

4) The PEP verifies the SAML token (signature and expiry time)

5) The PEP decides based on the content of the message body, the contents of the message header (including authentication token) and the context (i.e. applicable policies) whether to accept or to refuse the service request or reroute it. Although this is not imposed, the use of XACML or geoXACML for definition of policy rules is recommended.

6) If the request is authorized, then the request is processed by the target SP.

If any of the steps from 3) to 5) fails, then a fault response is returned to the client.

This approach is detailed in the following figure, which highlight the typical sequence of steps from authentication to request authorisation and processing.
6.2 Protocol binding

To provide an overall coherent architecture within this context, operations shall support the embedding of requests and responses in SOAP messages. Only SOAP messaging (via HTTP/POST or HTTPS/POST) with document/literal style shall be used. Messages should conform to SOAP 1.2 [NR22].

For authentication requests, only the body of SOAP envelope is used. For authorisation requests, the message payload shall be in the body of the SOAP envelope and the authentication token shall be in the WS-Security element in the header of the SOAP envelope.

6.3 Basic use cases

The use cases covered by this specification are shown in the following sequence diagram:

- Authentication: An authentication request is first made to the identity provider (IdP).
- Authorisation: A service request sent to the Service Provider (SP). This service request is, for instance, a call to any of the operations defined in the catalogue (OGC 06-131), ordering (OGC 06-141) or programming (OGC 07-018) specifications. The service requests can be synchronous or asynchronous via ws-addressing. This is transparent for the current specification.

An entity may be either an identity provider (IdP), a Service Provider (SP) or both IdP and SP.

This specification covers identity federation whereby the receiving IdP (Federating Entity), if not the IdP for the request, resolves the IdP and passes the authentication request to the correct IdP.

Authorisation requests (service requests) may address more than one entity, to perform so-called multi-mission requests, these requests are orchestrated by a BPEL workflow.

The policy enforcement on the SP is non invasive meaning that it is independent of the SP implementation.
The high level use case for authentication and authorisation is shown in the above figure. Note that the diagram has a higher level of abstraction than the other diagrams present in the remaining of the document; more precisely, the IdP depicted in the figure may be either on the Federating Entity or on any external entity. The same applies for the depicted SP. Following sections of this document further elaborate the detail of the authentication and authorisation.

1. The authentication request is sent by the client to the authentication service which in the Federating Entity is directly exposed as a Web service and does not pass through the PEP. However, if required a request could equally be intercepted by the IdP PEP and routed.

2. The client receives the authentication response containing the SAML token.

3. The client then sends a service request i.e. an authorisation request. This request contains the SAML token.

6.4 Security Model

The model is based on WS-Security SAML token profile [NR11]. The authentication request contains the name and password identifying the user plus an optional definition of the designated identity provider. The authentication response is a SAML token, which contains assertions\(^1\) about the authentication and attributes of the identified user.

\(^1\) The concept of "assertion" here is equivalent to the concept of "claim" in WS-Trust ([NR23]).
The authentication service receives user credentials in SOAP over an encrypted channel i.e. HTTPS. The signed and encrypted SAML token is returned as SOAP over HTTPS and subsequently used in service requests. It is an explicit design decision that the client is unable to decrypt the content of the encrypted SAML token.

6.4.1 Encryption

Encryption of the SAML token is performed by the authentication service during an authentication request and response. Decryption is performed by the PEP during the authorization request. The encryption algorithm used is the AES-128 as defined in [NR15]. The encryption process is as follows:

1. The authentication service first creates the symmetric key using the AES-128 encryption algorithm.
2. This symmetric key is then itself encrypted with the public key of the target Service Provider using the RSA encryption algorithm to create a secret key.
3. The SAML token is then encrypted with the generated secret key using the AES-128 encryption algorithm.
4. The message is then built.

The rationale of step 2 is that the SAML token is encrypted for a specific target Service Provider, which can be federated or not. Only the PEP of the targeted SP is able to decrypt the SAML token, through its private key. The criterion used by IdP to choose the "right" public key will be described in the Authentication Use Cases (section 6.5.3).

Example Authentication Request:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:q0="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <q0:authenticate>
      <q0:username>JohnDoe</q0:username>
      <q0:password>MyPassword</q0:password>
    </q0:authenticate>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

Example Encrypted Authentication Response:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:ns="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <ns:authenticateResponse>
      <xenc:EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
        <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
        <ds:KeyInfo>
          <xenc:EncryptedKey/>
        </ds:KeyInfo>
      </xenc:EncryptedData>
    </ns:authenticateResponse>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```
6.4.2 Signature / Message Digest

The SAML token is signed before it is encrypted. The signature process is characterized by the following statements:

- The secure hash SHA-1 digital signature message digest algorithm is used, as supported by [NR15].
- The element that is signed is the top-level SAML Assertion, i.e. `<urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion:Assertion>`.
- The signature is put as an "enveloped signature" method, which means that the signature element is embedded as a child of the afore-mentioned SAML Assertion element.
- No certificate is put in the signature. This means that the PEP verifying the signature has to know (from its keystore, for example) the public key of the IdP that produced the SAML token.

Note that the present specification only enforces the signature of SAML token, which is put in the SOAP body of authentication response and in the SOAP header of authorisation request. Other digital signatures on the remaining elements of SOAP messages, which may be required by interfaces of federated Service Providers, are permitted but these are out of the scope of the present specification.

The example below uses the user attributes listed in Annex D.

Example: signed token before encryption.

```xml
    <subject/>
  </authenticationStatement>
  <nameIdentifier>dail</nameIdentifier>
</assertion>
```
<saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</saml:ConfirmationMethod>
</saml:SubjectConfirmation>
</saml:Subject>
</saml:AuthenticationStatement>
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The security model proposed requires that the case of authentication request is further decomposed into three cases as described in the following section.

6.4.3 Authentication Use Cases

6.4.3.1 Federated IdP - local identification (Default Case)

In this use case the authentication request contains an identifier specifying the local entity as IdP. This is the default case when no IdP is provided in the request.

Example:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <q0:authenticate>
      <q0:username>TestUser</q0:username>
      <q0:password>TestUser42</q0:password>
    </soapenv:Body>
  </soapenv:Envelope>
</soapenv:Envelope>

Or

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <q0:authenticate>
      <q0:username>TestUser</q0:username>
      <q0:password>TestUser42</q0:password>
      <q0:servername>
       ...
      </q0:servername>
    </soapenv:Body>
  </soapenv:Envelope>
</soapenv:Envelope>

Figure 3 Federating (Local) Entity is request designated IdP (Default Case)

1. The authentication request is sent to the authentication service using SOAP over HTTPS. (May pass through the policy enforcement point (PEP) of the Federating Entity.)
2. (The PEP of the Federating Entity receives the request and forwards it to the authentication service of the Federating Entity.)

3. The authentication service verifies the identity in the local user registry over LDAP/LDAPS.

4. The authentication service creates a SAML token using the minimum profile attributes retrieved from the user registry. The SAML token is created containing assertion of the authentication and assertion regarding the value of the subset of attributes from the minimum user profile (see description in section 6.4.5).

5. The authentication service signs the SAML token using the Federating (local) Entity private key.

6. The authentication service encrypts the SAML token with the Federating (local) Entity public key.

7. The authentication response containing the encrypted and signed SAML token is returned to the PEP.

8. This authentication response is returned to the client using SOAP over HTTPS.

The client is unable to decrypt the content of SAML token present in the received authentication response; only the PEP of the Federating Entity can decrypt the SAML token.

6.4.3.2 Federated IdP - external identification

In this use case, the authentication request contains an identifier for the authentication service of a given external entity \( n \). The relation table between identifiers and external entities authentication service URL shall be stored on the server and configured at service deployment time. It must be done in this way for security as the system must deny access to untrusted authentication server.

Example Request with IdP:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
 xmlns:q0="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
 xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
 <soapenv:Body>
  <q0:authenticate>
   <q0:username>JohnDoe</q0:username>
   <q0:password>MyPassword</q0:password>
   <q0:serverName>SpotImage</q0:serverName>
  </q0:authenticate>
 </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```
1. The authentication request is sent to the policy enforcement point (PEP) of the Federating Entity using SOAP over HTTPS.

2. The PEP of the Federating Entity receives the request and forwards it to the authentication service of the Federating Entity.

3. The authentication service redirects the authentication request to the PEP of the designated External IdP. The authentication service URL is extracted from the table previously described.

4. The PEP of the external entity forwards the message to the authentication service of the external entity.

5. The authentication service verifies the user in the external entity user registry.

6. The authentication service creates the SAML token using the minimum profile attributes retrieved from the user profile in the user registry.

7. The authentication response containing the SAML token, in clear, in the SOAP body is returned to the External Entity PEP.

8. The authentication response is returned to the Authentication Service of the Federating IdP, through SOAP over HTTPS.

9. The authentication service signs the SAML token using the Federating (local) Entity private key.

10. The authentication service encrypts the SAML token with the Federating (local) Entity public key.

11. The authentication response containing the encrypted SAML token is returned to the PEP of Federating IdP.

12. The authentication response is returned to the client.
Notes:

1. The client is unable to decrypt the content of SAML token present in the received authentication response; only the PEP of the Federating entity can decrypt the SAML token, by using the local private key, which matches the public key used in step 10.

2. The confidentiality of the SAML token provided in clear by the external IdP is assured 1° by the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts the SOAP response and 2° by assuring that the requester of the authentication request is the Federating Entity, known in the circle of trust. Actually, about the last point, the rule is:

   if the requester is the federated entity,
   then the SAML token is returned in clear (present use case)
   else the SAML token is encrypted with the external entity's public key (see next use case)

The mechanism to identify the requester as a known federated entity is TBD or maybe left as an implementation decision. This could use WS-addressing.

The rationale of this process is to support both Clients that access the Federating Entity and Clients that access External Entity directly (provided that this last has its own IdP). Also, the system scales up seamlessly in the case of multiple federating entities, should this need occurs, sharing one or several federated SPs and/or IdPs: the external IdP should simply know a list of authorized federating entities (instead of a single one) and check inclusion of the requester in this list.

6.4.3.3 External IdP - local identification

In this use case, a Client interacts directly with an external entity, that has its own IdP and user registry, bypassing the federating IdP. The Client sends the authentication request to this IdP and receives an encrypted SAML token, that can only be used on this external entity. The process is essentially the same as the one described in the first use case seen above (Federated IdP - local identification”).

---

2 The design to which this specification applies has a single Federating Entity, which can have multiple clients. These clients are typically, but not only, Portals. For example the EO-DAIL (Federating Entity) will have at least two clients: EOLI-SA and DAIL Portal. Instead of having several federating entities, nothing prevents an existing Portal to become a client of the single Federating Entity. For example the EO-Portal may become a client of the EO-DAIL.

3 Note that several variant mechanisms are feasible, if we allow the inclusion of multiple SAML tokens in the authentication responses and/or authorisation requests. A client could then own several tokens for the same user at a given time, encrypted with different public keys and potentially carrying different contents. The PEP should then be given several "chances" (one per included SAML token) to succeed in decryption and to authorize a request. These variant mechanisms change the interfaces defined in the present version of the specification and, therefore, are no more than a subject of investigation.
1. The authentication request is sent to the authentication service using SOAP over HTTPS. (May pass through the policy enforcement point (PEP) of the External Entity.)

2. (The PEP of the External Entity receives the request and forwards it to the authentication service of the External Entity.)

3. The authentication service verifies the identity in the local user registry over LDAP/LDAPS.

4. The authentication service creates a SAML token using the minimum profile attributes retrieved from the user registry. The SAML token is created containing assertion of the authentication and assertion regarding the value of the subset of attributes from the minimum user profile (see description in section 6.4.5).

5. The authentication service signs the SAML token using the External (local) Entity private key.

6. The authentication service encrypts the SAML token with the External (local) Entity public key.

7. The authentication response containing the encrypted and signed SAML token is returned to the PEP.

8. This authentication response is returned to the client using SOAP over HTTPS.

The client is unable to decrypt the content of SAML token present in the received authentication response; only the PEP of the External Entity can decrypt the SAML token.
Note that the choice made at step 6 to encrypt the SAML token with the local public key is made on the basis of the decision rule presented in the previous use case (here, the Client has not been identified as the Federating Entity).

6.4.4 Authorisation Request

The authorisation request may contain an encrypted SAML token in the WS-Security element of the SOAP header. This SAML token is obtained from an authentication request as previously described and is used to control access to services.

N.B. It is not mandatory that the authorisation request is preceded by an authentication request, as the SAML token is not mandatory in the service request. However, access to services is controlled by the policies applied in the PEP.

Since a specific SAML token protocol is required to access the protected Web Services, the use of WS-Policy [NR20] is recommended for the WSDL files describing these Web services. The WS-Policy elements are used to formally specify the presence of SAML token in SOAP header, the encryption algorithm, etc. With such dispositions, the Web services are self-describing, allowing for "discovery" by clients, hence improving the interoperability of the system. An example of WSDL using WS-Policy is provided in annex F.

The access policies applied in each PEP, based on the SAML token, are out of scope of the present specification. However, to help understanding, several examples of authorisation rules along with their XACML counterparts are provided in section 9.

6.4.5 OASIS SAML

SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) [NR11] is the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorisation data between security domains, i.e. exchange between an identity provider (producer of assertions) and a Service Provider (consumer of assertions).

SAML is required to implement federated identity and identifies two roles; the identity provider (IdP) and the Service Provider. These communicate through SAML assertions. A SAML assertion is an XML document containing information about how the user was authenticated and can contain other user attributes. SAML bindings are defined for HTTP Post and SOAP.

SAML includes mechanisms that allow providers to communicate privacy policy/settings from one to the other. For instance, a Principal's consent to some operation being performed can be obtained at one provider and this fact communicated to another provider through the SAML assertions and protocols.

A SAML assertion is a package of information that supplies one or more statements made by a SAML authority.

- Authentication: The specified subject was authenticated by a particular means at a particular time. A typical authentication statement asserts Subject S authenticated at time t using authentication method m.

- Attribute: The specified subject is associated with the supplied attributes. A typical attribute statement asserts Subject S is associated with attributes X,Y,Z having values v1,v2,v3. Relying parties use attributes to make access control decisions.
WS-Security SAML Token Profile [NR11] defines how SAML assertions are processed in SOAP messages.

SAML 1.1 is proposed to encode the user authentication token.

The set of attributes that are put in the SAML token shall be defined by agreement of all the parties in the circle of trust. This is an essential part of the interface between the producer of SAML token (IdPs) and consumers (PEPs). Hence, the attribute names to be used in the SAML assertions as well as the semantic or their origin of the associated value shall be defined precisely. Typically, a table shall specify a set of associations between SAML token's attribute names and LDAP user directory's attribute names. The authentication service of IdP shall comply with this attributes specification to build up the SAML tokens. On the other side, the access policy rules enforced on PEPs (i.e. XACML rules) shall be written on the basis of the same attributes specification.

The set of attributes shall be defined by respecting two groups of constraints:

- there shall be enough attributes to allow the different PEP implementing their specific access policies;
- the chosen attributes shall comply with the privacy policies of all the parties in the circle of trust.

Note that each of these two constraints "pulls" the selection decision in opposite directions, so the actual set of attributes to be included in the token results from a trade-off.

An example of such SAML token attributes specification is provided in annex.

6.4.6 OASIS Ws-Security

Web Services Security [NR9] from OASIS is a communications protocol providing for security of Web services. WS-Security 1.0 was released on April 19 2004 and version 1.1 on February 17 2006.

WS-Security is proposed to encode the SAML assertions in the SOAP header. WS-Security SAML Token Profile defines how SAML assertions are processed in SOAP messages and so it is proposed for this interface.

6.4.6.1 Encryption

Encryption is required to prevent the message content being read by someone other than the intended recipient. N.b. It does not prevent the message being modified, for this a digital signature is required.

The recipient, in this case the Service Providers “publish” their certificates allowing “anyone” to encrypt a message to them using the published public key. Only the recipient holding the corresponding private key can decrypt such a message.

6.4.6.2 Signature

WS-Security permits digital signatures to be used to prove that the message has not been changed since sending. A recipient can be sure that it is the user who has signed the message. The XML signature <ds:Signature> element of WS-Security can be used for signature.

a. Sender : Hash and signs (encrypts the hash code)
b. Receiver : Hash and verify hash (decrypts the hash)
c. Ensures that the message was sent by a known client and that the message arrived intact.
The following picture shows the general mechanism of digital signature. The sender, on the left of the picture, calculates a hash (or digest) value \( xyz \) from the message to be sent; this value is encrypted with the private key of the sender (\( xyz# \)) and appended in the message. The signed message is sent towards a receiver, on the right of the picture (this may include encryption / decryption steps, which are not represented). The receiver decrypts the signature \( xyz# \) with a public key of the sender to get the expected hash value \( xyz \). It calculates the actual hash value from the message (with the same algorithm as the sender) and compares it with the received value \( xyz \). If they differ, the signature is declared invalid, which means that the signed message has been altered during the transmission. If they are equal, the signature is declared valid, which means that the signed message has not been altered\(^4\).

Figure 6 Digital Signature

Message encryption is not sufficient to guarantee that the message comes from a trusted client as this depends on how many people know the “encryption code”. It does not prevent someone from changing the message content.

SAML used with XML signature <ds:Signature> element of WS-Security allows signing the messages as well:

1. Sender: Hash and signs (encrypts the hash code)
2. Receiver: Hash and verify hash (decrypts the hash)

\(^4\) To be accurate, a valid signature means that it is extremely unlikely that the message has been altered.
7 Interface

7.1 Authenticate

The Authenticate operation allows clients to retrieve authentication metadata from a nominated IdP server. The response to an Authenticate request should be an XML document containing authentication metadata about the authentication and requestor.

7.1.1 Request

Protocol: SOAP over HTTPS

7.1.2 XML encoding

The following XML-Schema fragment defines the XML encoding of the message body of the Authenticate operation.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:q0="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <q0:authenticate>
      <q0:username>TestUser</q0:username>
      <q0:password>TestUser42</q0:password>
      <q0:servername>spot</q0:servername>
    </q0:authenticate>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

Figure 7: Example Authenticate Request

7.1.3 Response

The following XML shows an encrypted example response.
The authenticate response message is always encrypted with the Federating Entity public key i.e. in both the use cases the client receives the same response:

- the federated response message to the Federating Entity authentication service and coming from an external Idp.
- The federated response message returned by the Federating Entity authentication service to a client.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <ns:authenticateResponse xmlns:ns="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop">
      <ns:return>
        <xenc:EncryptedData xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
            Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
          <xenc:EncryptionMethod
              Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
          <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
            <xenc:EncryptedKey
                Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/>
            <xenc:CipherData>
              <xenc:CipherValue>cbE8viFOMyDUxR8N4EdwS9UKpSoUbMrWSVprW7IypMWfZLaeH9Rx4dIw5</xenc:CipherValue>
            </xenc:CipherData>
          </ds:KeyInfo>
        </xenc:EncryptionMethod>
      </ns:return>
    </ns:authenticateResponse>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```
7.1.3.1 Example Authentication Response Before Encryption

An example is given here for completeness of the fragment before encryption:

```xml
<assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
            xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"
            AssertionID="oracle.security.xmlsec.saml.Assertion1955a65"
            Issuer="http://earth.esa.int"
            MajorVersion="1"
            MinorVersion="1">
                                 AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:password">
        <subject>
            <nameIdentifier>dail</nameIdentifier>
            <subjectConfirmation>
                <confirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</confirmationMethod>
            </subjectConfirmation>
        </subject>
        <nameIdentifier>DAIL42</nameIdentifier>
        <subjectConfirmation>
            <confirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</confirmationMethod>
        </subjectConfirmation>
    </authenticationStatement>
    <attributeStatement>
        <subject>
            <nameIdentifier>dail</nameIdentifier>
            <subjectConfirmation>
                <confirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</confirmationMethod>
            </subjectConfirmation>
        </subject>
        <nameIdentifier>DAIL42</nameIdentifier>
        <subjectConfirmation>
            <confirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:bearer</confirmationMethod>
        </subjectConfirmation>
    </attributeStatement>
</assertion>
```
7.1.4 Failed Authentication Request

Security considerations require that full error information is not returned to the user. An example is given below:

```xml
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <soapenv:Fault>
      <soapenv:Server>
        <soapenv:Exception occurred while trying to invoke service method Authenticate>
      </soapenv:Server>
    </soapenv:Fault>
  </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

7.1.5 WSDL

The WSDL is given below for the authentication Web service used by the identity provider.

```xml
<wsdl:definitions xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/
ristyles="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/mime/"
 xmlns:soap12="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap12/"
 xmlns:http="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/http/
 xmlns:ns1="http://org.apache.axis2/xsd"
 xmlns:wsaw="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl"
 xmlns:ns="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
 xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/
 targetNamespace="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop">
  <wsdl:documentation>AuthenticationService</wsdl:documentation>
  <wsdl:types>
    <xs:schema attributeFormDefault="qualified"
     elementFormDefault="qualified"
     targetNamespace="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop">
      <wsdl:import namespace="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
      xsi:import namespace="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop"
      schemaLocation="/authentication.xsd"/>
    </xs:schema>
  </wsdl:types>
  <wsdl:message name="authenticateRequest">
    <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:authenticate"/>
  </wsdl:message>
</wsdl:definitions>
```
<wsdl:message name="authenticateResponse">
  <wsdl:part name="parameters" element="ns:authenticateResponse"/>
</wsdl:message>

<wsdl:portType name="AuthenticationServicePortType">
  <wsdl:operation name="authenticate">
    <wsdl:input message="ns:authenticateRequest"
        wsaw:Action="urn:authenticate"/>
    <wsdl:output message="ns:authenticateResponse"
        wsaw:Action="urn:authenticateResponse"/>
  </wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>

<wsdl:binding name="AuthenticationServiceSoap11Binding"
type="ns:AuthenticationServicePortType">
  <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"
      style="document"/>
  <wsdl:operation name="authenticate">
    <soap:operation soapAction="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop#authenticate" style="document"/>
    <wsdl:input>
      <soap:body use="literal"/>
    </wsdl:input>
    <wsdl:output>
      <soap:body use="literal"/>
    </wsdl:output>
  </wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>

<wsdl:binding name="AuthenticationServiceSoap12Binding"
type="ns:AuthenticationServicePortType">
  <soap12:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http"
      style="document"/>
  <wsdl:operation name="authenticate">
    <soap12:operation soapAction="http://earth.esa.int/um/eop#authenticate" style="document"/>
    <wsdl:input>
      <soap12:body use="literal"/>
    </wsdl:input>
    <wsdl:output>
      <soap12:body use="literal"/>
    </wsdl:output>
  </wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>

<wsdl:binding name="AuthenticationServiceHttpBinding"
type="ns:AuthenticationServicePortType">
  <http:binding verb="POST"/>
  <wsdl:operation name="authenticate">
    <http:operation location="AuthenticationService/authenticate"/>
    <wsdl:input>
      <mime:content type="text/xml" part="authenticate"/>
    </wsdl:input>
    <wsdl:output>
      <mime:content type="text/xml" part="authenticate"/>
    </wsdl:output>
  </wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>

<wsdl:service name="AuthenticationService">
  <wsdl:port name="AuthenticationServiceHttpSoap11Endpoint"
binding="ns:AuthenticationServiceSoap11Binding">
Figure 9: Authentication Service WSDL

7.2 ServiceRequest

Through the implementation of this interface to the ServiceRequest (i.e. the service operations such as the catalogue GetRecords, the programming GetFeasibility etc.) authenticated clients will send requests to a server controlling access to the final service. The request is made using WS-Security containing the SAML token previously returned in the AuthenticationResponse.

N.b. The service requests from a client to the Federating Entity or from the Federating Entity to a Service Provider are the same.

7.2.1 Request

Protocol: SOAP plus WS-Security over HTTP/HTTPS.

7.2.2 XML encoding

The following XML-Schema fragment defines the XML encoding of an example ServiceRequest operation

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <env:Header>
    <wsa:ReplyTo xmlns:wsa="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2003/03/addressing"/>
    <wsa:Address/>
    <wsa:ReplyTo>
      <Security xmlns="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">
        <xenc:EncryptedData Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"/>
      </Security>
    </wsa:ReplyTo>
  </env:Header>
</env:Envelope>
```
<xenc:CipherData>
  <xenc:EncryptedData>
    <Security>
      <env:Header>
        <env:Body>
          <csw:GetRecords maxRecords="10" outputFormat="application/xml"
outputSchema="urn:oasis:names:tc:ebxml-regrep:xsd:rim:3.0"
resultType="results" service="CSW" startPosition="1"
version="2.0.2"
xmlns:aoi="http://www.esa.int/xml/schemas/mass/aoifeatures"
xmlns:common="http://exslt.org/common"
xmlns:csw="http://www.opengis.net/cat/csw/2.0.2"
xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
xmlns:ogc="http://www.opengis.net/ogc"
xmlns:portal="http://www.esa.int/mass" xmlns:rim="urn:oasis:names:tc:ebxml-regrep:xsd:rim:3.0"
xmlns:serviceNs="http://www.opengis.net/cat/wrs/1.0"
xmlns:wrs="http://www.opengis.net/cat/wrs/1.0">
            <csw:Query typeNames="rim:RegistryPackage rim:ExtrinsicObject
rim:ExtrinsicObject dataLayer rim:Association_acquisitionPlatform
rim:ExtrinsicObject dataLayerAsso rim:Association_acquisitionPlatAsso
rim:Classification rim:ClassificationNode">
              <csw:ElementSetName typeNames="rim:RegistryPackage">full</csw:ElementSetName>
              <csw:Constraint version="1.1.0">
                <ogc:Filter>
                  <ogc:And>
                    <ogc:BBOX>
                      <gml:Envelope srsName="EPSG:4326" xmlns="http://www.esa.int/xml/schemas/mass/aoifeatures"
xmlns:sch="http://www.ascc.net/xml/schematron"
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
                        <gml:lowerCorner>23.1368 -
                        </gml:lowerCorner>
                        <gml:upperCorner>58.3726
                        </gml:upperCorner>
                    </gml:Envelope>
                    <ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo>
                      <ogc:PropertyName>/rim:ExtrinsicObject/rim:Slot[@name='urn:ogc:def:e
brIM-Slot:OGC-06-131:MultiExtentOf']</ogc:PropertyName>
                    </ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo>
                    <ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo>
                      <ogc:PropertyName>/rim:ExtrinsicObject/@objectType</ogc:PropertyName>
                    </ogc:PropertyIsEqualTo>
                  </ogc:And>
                </ogc:Filter>
                </csw:Constraint>
            </csw:GetRecords>
          </csw:Query>
        </env:Body>
      </env:Header>
    </Security>
  </xenc:EncryptedData>
</xenc:CipherData>
Figure 10: Service Request Example

7.2.3 Failed Request

An example is given below:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
<soapenv:Body>
<soapenv:Fault>
<faultcode>AuthorisationFailed</faultcode>
faultstring>Country of origin not authorised</faultstring>
```
7.3 ServiceResponse

7.3.1 Synchronous

The service response is as defined in the corresponding catalogue, ordering and programming specifications.

7.3.2 Use Case: User logs in at client and makes Synchronous Service Request to Federating Entity Service

In this case the sequence is as follows:

1. A user already registered in the local (Federating Entity) user registry logs in at the client (Federating Entity Client or an external client).
2. The client authenticates the user through the Federating Entity authentication service.
3. The Federating Entity authentication service:
   - validates the user,
   - creates the SAML assertions from the information held in the user registry
   - signs the SAML assertion with the Federating Entity's private key.
   - encrypts the signed SAML assertion with the Federating Entity's public key.
4. The Federating Entity authentication service returns the authentication response containing the encrypted SAML token.
5. The user is given confirmation of login.
6. The user selects a service.
7. The client constructs the service request and inserts the encrypted SAML assertion in the request. (N.b. The client should manage the token validity as it is possible that the token has expired and will therefore not pass the PEP checks. To ensure the token has not expired an authentication request could be requested at each service request).
8. The service request is sent.
9. The Federating Entity PEP decrypts the token using the Federating Entity private key and applies policy checks.
10. The request is forwarded to the Federating Entity Web service.
11. Service request for the external entity is constructed and the SAML token in the header is encrypted with the external entity's public key.
12. The service request is sent to the external entity PEP.
13. The external entity PEP decrypts the token using the external entity's private key and applies policy checks.
7.3.3 Asynchronous

The asynchronous service response is as defined in the corresponding catalogue, ordering and programming specifications. This response may be protected by the same encryption and signature as defined for the service request and authentication. The sequence is as follows:

1. The SP prepares the response to the endpoint mentioned in the WS_Address.

2. The Service Provider creates a token authenticating himself i.e. external entity and signs it with his private key. This is then encrypted with the public key of the Federating Entity and inserted into the asynchronous response in the same way as previously described for a service request.

3. The asynchronous response is returned to the address provided in the ws_addressing of the request. This will normally be the address of a PEP.
8 Security Considerations

The interface that is presented in the current document was designed according to a specific set of security requirements. Other application domains may want to take additional security measures which are complementary to the minimal interface defined in the current document.

The present section identifies different types of attack or threats that are specific to the present interface; it provides for each of these types of attack or threat the answer or countermeasure, as entailed by the interface. When required, the distinction is made between authentication requests and service requests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of attack / threat</th>
<th>Answer / countermeasures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity Spoofing</strong></td>
<td>The sole artefact that conveys user identity, i.e. an evidence of authentication, is the SAML token. The IdP guarantees that the SAML token for user X is returned if and only if the credentials of X have been provided (see next threat topics related to password). For the service requests, the risk is the theft of SAML token, which could be rebound to a new service request issued by a malicious user. This risk is limited by putting short expiry time on SAML token; as the expiry time is part of the SAML token itself, it is protected from changes by signature. The expiry time and signature are both checked by the PEP. Also, HTTPS could be used to avoid (through encryption) the risk of such forged service request. Another countermeasure consists in calculating the signature of SOAP body and putting this as detached signature in the security element of the SOAP header, itself secured by encryption. Then the PEP can verify, by signature checking, that the SAML token has not be rebound.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Man-in-the-middle</strong></td>
<td>For authentication request: the transport protocol is HTTPS, which is based on SSL; SSL includes a certificate mechanism to protect against man-in-the-middle attack. For service requests (if no secured HTTP is used): the signature protocol guarantees that the emitter of SAML token is a trusted IdP and that the token has not been tampered with; this is checked by the PEP. The threat is therefore located on the message payload (SOAP body) or its binding with SAML token. Such threat is analyzed in Identity Spoofing, Data integrity, Data confidentiality topics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data integrity</strong></td>
<td>The signature protocol enforced on SAML Token allows for the verification of its own data integrity, at the PEP level. The data integrity of the message payload may be checked by another signature mechanism on the SOAP body. Such signature should be bound in some way with the SOAP header, in order to avoid the risk of forged service request (see “identity spoofing” topic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data confidentiality / privacy violation</strong></td>
<td>Encryption of SAML token (both for authentication requests and service requests) guarantees that no entity excepting the target PEP can read conveyed user attributes. For service request, the data confidentiality of the message payload may be enforced by using HTTPS protocol or by encryption of the SOAP body. The LDAP registry is protected by password, which is known only by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
security officer and IdP. The IdP is a "trusted" entity.

**Replay attack**

For authentication requests: the transport protocol is HTTPS, which is based on SSL; SSL includes a "nonce" mechanism to protect against replay attack.

For service requests (if simple HTTP is used): the risk of unauthorized access through replay of a past service request is limited by putting short expiry time on SAML token, which is checked by the PEP. Also, a replay protection may be implemented using a hashing function or digital signature which provides a unique identifier that can be used to determine if the same message is received multiple times.

**Denial of Service**

Web service is susceptible to message flooding denial of service attacks from message replay. “replay detection” mechanisms can be used.

**Password Disclosure**

Authenticate request uses SOAP over HTTPS. The password is therefore encrypted during transmission from client to IdP.

It is an implementation decision whether deployments use an LDAP registry. If LDAP is used, the LDAP registry is protected by password, which is known only by security officer and IdP. The user passwords are stored encrypted on LDAP registry. Secure LDAP (SLDAP) protocol may be used also.

The risk of password disclosure is therefore limited to known and usual factors, which can be mitigated by enforcing an adequate password policy (out of scope of the present interface).

**Password Cracking / Guessing**

This risk is limited to known and usual factors, which can be mitigated by enforcing an adequate password policy (out of scope of the present interface).

**Unauthorized access**

The authorisation to Web services relies on PEP and associated access policy rules. The rules are based on asserted user attributes in the SAML token. The fact that these attributes match the actual requesting user relies on authentication.

The following table covers implementation-dependant threats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of attack / threat</th>
<th>Answer / countermeasures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SQL injection</strong></td>
<td>If a RDBMS is used for user registry, there is a risk of SQL injection for the authentication operation, i.e. a hacker enters as user id or password, some malicious character string that are interpreted by SQL engine. Such risk can be prevented by performing string validation and character escaping on input user id / password strings, before SQL lookup (out of scope of the present interface).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LDAP injection</strong></td>
<td>If a LDAP registry is used for user registry, there is a risk of LDAP injection, i.e. a hacker enters as user id or password, some malicious character string that are interpreted by LDAP or JNDI API. See</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9 Authorisation Use Cases (non-normative)

As explained before, authorisation rules that grant access to Web services shall be evaluated by a dedicated PEP that wraps such services. However, the PEP treatments and the way access rules are stored and evaluated are not in the scope of the present document. The present section provides non-normative information about this topic.

In order to separate responsibilities, a PEP typically relies on a PDP (Policy Decision Point) that performs the actual evaluation of access rules based on the request payload (i.e. the SOAP body), on the attributes of the SAML token, if any, present in the SOAP header and on "external" elements (e.g. current time). Each PDP should have a dedicated policy store, where needed access rules or policies can easily be stored, retrieved and maintained.

The rules used by each PDP should be expressed in a standard syntax: the eXtended Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is recommended here. XACML (see [NR21]) is, in essence, a declarative access control policy language implemented in XML.

The following provides use cases and examples of policy rules, with XACML fragments implementing them. More comprehensive examples shall be found in annex E.

9.1 Uses Case: restrict access for time period

Generic policy rule:

Restrict data access for a given time period

Analysis:

XACML allows to define Rules based on “environment attributes”, such as date and time. A rich set of functions for handling date, time and dateTime values (as defined in the W3C XML Schema specification) are predefined in XACML.

Example:

Although able to access the service the user cannot access images from period t1=09:00:00 to t2=12:00:00.

The time restriction can be expressed as a Condition in an XACML rule as follows:

```xml
<Condition>
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:time-in-range">
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
      <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator
        AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time"
        DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time"/>
    </Apply>
  </Apply>
</Condition>
```

Example Value:

```xml
<AttributeValue
  DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">09:00:00</AttributeValue>
```
See annex E for a more comprehensive example.

9.2 Uses Case: enforce rules for specific group of users

Generic policy rule:

enforce rules, like temporal restriction seen before, for specific group of users

Analysis:

XACML allows defining rules which target specific subjects. The rule for the current requirement can be expressed by targeting the group of users whose access shall be regulated together with a time restriction condition.

 Needless to say, the group of users shall be targetable through an attribute contained in the SAML authentication token. In this way, a Rule with the following target could be defined:

Example:

Enforce rule for the users having the role "guest".

<XACML>
  <Target>
    <Subjects>
      <Subject>
        <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">guest</AttributeValue>
        </SubjectMatch>
        <SubjectAttributeDesignator
          AttributeId="urn:ogc:um:eop:0.0.4:saml:role"
          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
      </Subject>
    </Subjects>
  </Target>
</XACML>

where AttributeId="urn:ogc:um:eop:0.0.4:saml:role" is a user-defined attribute contained in the XACML decision request which holds the suitable SAML Token attribute value identifying the group of users subjects to the Rule.

Notice that a Rule Target can match more than one Subject.

See annex E for a more comprehensive example.

9.3 Uses Case: restrict access to the type of data

Generic policy rule:

restrict access to the type of data e.g. high or low resolution data

Analysis:
XACML allows to define Rules which target specific attributes of the resource to access. However, we assume that this information is either contained in the client request to the Service, or in a configuration file.

Notice that, building a Rule restricting access for certain data values but these data values are not provided in input, can result in an Indeterminate Policy (Indeterminate means that an error occurred or some required value was missing, so a decision cannot be made).

**Example:**

See annex E.

### 9.4 Uses Case: restrict access to data based on the age of the data

**Generic policy rule:**

restrict access to data based on the age of the data

*The age of data is an essential parameter to be considered for some products within EUMETSAT data policy (for instance at the moment Meteosat data are only accessible for retrieval from the archive 24 hours after sensing time).*

**Analysis:**

If the age of data is a piece of information contained in the service request, it is possible to define a rule which set restrictions on the access to the data based on their age.

**Example:**

For example, the following Condition evaluates to true if the current dateTime is greater than the acquisition end time of the data + 24 hours.

```xml
<Condition>
  <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:dateTime-greater-than-or-equal">
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-one-and-only">
      <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator
        AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-dateTime"
        DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime"/>
    </Apply>
    <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-add-dayTimeDuration">
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:dateTime-one-and-only">
        <ResourceAttributeDesignator
          AttributeId="urn:ogc:def:ebRIM-Slot:OGC-06-131:endPosition"
          DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime"/>
      </Apply>
      <AttributeValue
        DataType="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/WD-xquery-operators-20020816#dayTimeDuration">
        <xf:dt-dayTimeDuration>PT24H</xf:dt-dayTimeDuration>
      </AttributeValue>
    </Apply>
  </Apply>
</Condition>
```

Where `AttributeId="urn:ogc:def:ebRIM-Slot:OGC-06-131:endPosition"` is a user-defined attribute contained in the XACML decision request which holds the corresponding value of the service request.
9.5 *Uses Case: imposing geographical constraints*

**Generic policy rule:**

imposing geographical constraints, i.e. area of interest (AOI), allowing some users to access more areas than others.

**Analysis:**

XACML is a general-purpose access control policy language and does not include specific functions and attributes to handle geographical rules. Given that it is also an extensible language, the user can add his/her own attributes and functions, or, better, in this case, he/she can integrate the XACML rules with GeoXACML, which specifically addresses geographical constraints.

9.6 *Uses Case: access and check source, content, user credentials and time*

**Generic policy rule:**

access and check source, content, user credentials and time

**Analysis:**

XACML rules targets the following groups of attributes:

- Subject
- Resource
- Action
- Environment

A rich set of attributes are predefined for each group together with functions to handle them, according to their types. Additionally, XACML can be extended with user defined attributes and functions.

9.7 *Uses Case: restricting access to users from certain geographic locations.*

**Generic policy rule:**

restricting access to users from certain geographic locations.

**Analysis:**

An XACML Rule can be defined to restrict access to users from geographical locations provided that this information is contained in the request to the Service Provider.

For example, if the authentication is performed according to the present “User Management Interfaces for Earth Observation” specification, then the request may contain a SAML Token with attributes defined according to the “GMES Minimum Profile”; one of these attribute is the “country of origin” of the subject requesting access. Consequently, this attribute will be embedded in the XAML decision request and a Rule can be defined accordingly.

**Example:**
See annex E.

9.8 Uses Case: route service access based on user type

Generic policy rule:
Route a service access based on user type.

Note: e.g. This would allow a “scientific” user request to be routed to DLR and a “commercial” user request to be routed to Infoterra.

Analysis:
This requirement could be met using the XACML Obligations; the Obligation is defined as follows:

“Obligation - An operation specified in a policy or policy set that should be performed by the PEP in conjunction with the enforcement of an authorization decision”

In our case, the operation to be carried out is sending the request to the suitable provider; for each user type value, a policy can be defined with the following features:

- a rule matching a target subject type and having effect “permit”;
- an obligation to send the request to the suitable Service Provider if the policy evaluates to “permit”;
Annex A: Abstract Test Suite (Normative)

1 Conformance Test Class: The core

1.1 Test Module M.1 Basic requirements

This Test Module is made up of Abstract Test Cases which establishes preliminaries conditions to the actual test cases, such as the protocol bindings, messaging framework, adoption of specification and algorithms to encrypt and sign the messages.

1.1.1 ATC-1.1 SOAP Binding of the request/response messages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case identifier</th>
<th>“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:soap-binding”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Test assertion [purpose] | Operations shall support the embedding of requests and responses in SOAP messages. Only SOAP messaging (via HTTP/POST or HTTPS/POST) with document/literal style shall be used. Messages should conform to SOAP 1.2. The following assertions shall hold: 
  • The SOAP Header holds the authentication token [if applicable], embedded in a WS-Security element. 
  • The SOAP Body holds the message payload. |
| Test method | Send a request embedded in a SOAP Envelope over the HTTP[S] protocol; verify that a response is returned (even in case of failure) embedded in a SOAP Envelope over the HTTP[S] protocol. The SOAP Envelope shall be compliant with version 1.2 of SOAP (namespace http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/) |
| Reference | Clause 6.2 |
| Test type | Capability |

1.1.2 ATC-1.2 SAML token encoding for authentication information

| Test case identifier | “urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:saml-token” |
### Test assertion

**[purpose]**

SAML 1.1 is proposed to encode the user authentication token. WS-Security is proposed to encode the SAML assertions in the SOAP header.

A SAML token is made of the following statements:

- **Authentication statements**: a typical authentication statement asserts Subject S authenticated at time t using authentication method m.

- **Attribute statements**: a typical attribute statement asserts Subject S is associated with attributes X,Y,Z having values v1,v2,v3.

The set of attribute statements returned in a SAML token shall be defined according to the GMES Minimum User Profile

### Test method

- Send a valid authentication request to [the Identity Provider of] the Federating Entity; the response shall contain a SOAP message whose SOAP Body holds an encrypted SAML token.

- Decrypt the SAML token using the Orchestrating Service Provider private key, and verify that the SAML token has the expected statements belonging to the minimum user profile.

### Pre-condition:

For carrying out this test, the client needs a copy of the Orchestrating Service Provider private key. Since the Orchestrating Service Provider is a component of the Federating Entity, the client ultimately holds a copy of the private key of the Federating Entity.

For testing purposes, a couple of private/public keys can be generated using available tools (for example, ‘keytool’ on JRE), where the certificate with the public key is self-signed by the Federating Entity itself.

### Reference

Clauses 6.4.5 and 6.4.6

### Test type

Capability

### 1.1.3 ATC-1.3 Encryption algorithm for SAML token

Encryption of the SAML token is performed by the authentication service when creating an authentication response.

Decryption and encryption of SAML token is performed by [the PEP of] the Orchestrating Service Provider during authorization request orchestration [assuming that an Orchestrating Service Provider receives all of the incoming authorization requests].

Decryption of SAML token is performed by [the PEP of] the final Service Provider when handling the authorization request.

### Test case identifier

urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:encryption
### Test assertion [purpose]
The encryption algorithm used for the SAML token is the AES-128. The symmetric AES-128 key used for encryption is made available to the recipient as follows:

- The key is encrypted using the asymmetric RSA encryption algorithm with the public key of the recipient.
- The resulting value is added to the encrypted message, using the XML Encryption [NR17] and XML Signature [NR18] specifications.

### Test method

1. Send a valid authentication request to [the Identity Provider of] the Federating Entity; the response shall contain a SOAP message whose SOAP Body holds encrypted data.
2. Decrypt the AES-128 symmetric key contained in the response using the Orchestrating Service Provider private key.
3. Decrypt the SAML token using the AES-128 symmetric key and check that the result contains a valid SAML Assertion.

**Pre-condition:**

For carrying out this test, the client needs a copy of the Orchestrating Service Provider private key. Since the Orchestrating Service Provider is a component of the Federating Entity, the client ultimately holds a copy of the private key of the Federating Entity.

For testing purposes, a couple of private/public keys can be generated using available tools (for example, ‘keytool’ on JRE), where the certificate with the public key is self-signed by the Federating Entity itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Clauses 6.4.1 and 6.4.6.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Test type**

Basic

### 1.1.4 ATC-1.4 Digest algorithm for signing SAML tokens

| Test case identifier | urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:digest |

### Test assertion [purpose]
The secure hash SHA-1 digital signature message digest algorithm is proposed. The SAML Token is signed before encryption.

The XML signature `<ds:Signature>` element of can be used for signature, according to WS-Security specification.
1. Send an authentication request to [the Identity Provider of] the Federating Entity
2. Check that the response contains an encrypted SAML token and decrypt it following the process specified in ATC 1.3
3. Digest the SAML token using the SHA-1 algorithm
4. Decrypt the signature using the private key of the Orchestrating Service Provider.
5. Compare the digest obtained at step 3 with the value resulting from step 4. The two values shall match.

Pre-condition:

For carrying out this test, the client needs a copy of the Orchestrating Service Provider private key. Since the Orchestrating Service Provider is a component of the Federating Entity, the client ultimately holds the private key of the Federating Entity.

- For testing purposes, a couple of private/public keys can be generated using available tools (for example, ‘keytool’ on JRE), where the certificate with the public key is self-signed by the Federating Entity.

Reference

Clause 6.4.2 and 6.4.6.2

Test type

Basic

1.1.5 Test Module M.2 Authentication

This Test Module is made up of Abstract Test Cases related to the management of authentication requests and responses.

- The first test case is related to the following scenario: the client issues an authentication request to the Federating Entity without indicating the Identity Provider in charge of fulfilling the request; this is the default case, and implies that the recipient Federating Entity shall fulfill the request;

- The second test case is related to the following scenario: the client issues an authentication request to the Federating Entity explicitly indicating the Federating Entity as the Identity Provider in charge of fulfilling the request;

- The first test case is related to the following scenario: the client issues an authentication request to the Federating Entity explicitly indicating an external entity as the Identity Provider in charge of fulfilling the request;

A final test case (to be split into more specific test cases when the present specification will be completed) is devoted to handling of request failure

1.1.6 ATC-2.1 No request designated IdP - Federating entity resolved as IdP

Test case identifier

“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:authentication-1”
| Test assertion [purpose] | The Federating Entity is assumed to be the request designated IdP.  
| In this use case the authentication request contains only the user credentials (username, password). |
| Test method | The client issues an authentication request with:  
| • mandatory username/password information; |
| Verify that the client receives a SAML token which is signed and encrypted according to ATC-1.4. |
| The protocol to be used for the message exchange is SOAP/HTTPS. The SAML token shall be returned in the SOAP Body of the response. |
| Reference | Clause 6.4.3.1 |
| Test type | Capability |

### 1.1.7 ATC-2.2 Federating Entity is request designated IdP

Test case identifier | “urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:authentication-2”

| Test assertion [purpose] | The Federating Entity is the request designated IdP.  
| In this use case the authentication request contains an identifier for the Federating Entity authentication service. |
| Test method | The client issues an authentication request with:  
| • mandatory username/password information;  
| • an identifier for the Federating Entity. |
| Verify that the client receives a SAML token which is signed and encrypted according to ATC-1.4. |
| The protocol to be used for the message exchange is SOAP/HTTPS. The SAML token shall be returned in the SOAP Body of the response. |
| Reference | Clause 6.4.3.1 |
| Test type | Capability |

### 1.1.8 ATC-2.3 External Entity is request designated IdP

Test case identifier | “urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:authentication-3”

| Test assertion [purpose] | The External Entity is request designated IdP.  
| In this use case the authentication request contains an identifier for the external entity. |
**Test method**

The client issues an authentication request with:

- mandatory username/password information;
- an identifier for the External Entity.

Verify that the client receives a SAML token which is signed and encrypted according to ATC-1.4.

The protocol to be used for the message exchange is SOAP/HTTPS. The SAML token shall be returned in the SOAP Body of the response.

**Reference**

Clause 6.4.3.2

**Test type**

Capability

### 1.1.9 ATC-2.4 Authentication request failure

**Test case identifier**

“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:authentication-failure”

**Test assertion [purpose]**

The Federating Entity shall return a SOAP fault message if an authentication request cannot be fulfilled. The SOAP fault shall clearly indicate raison of failure.

**Test method**

The client issues an authentication request to the Federating entity, with wrong credentials. Verify that a SOAP fault response is returned indicating reason of failure.

**Reference**

Clause 7.1.4

**Test type**

Capability

### 1.2 Test Module M.3 Authorization

This Test Module is made up of Abstract Test Cases related to the management of authorization requests and responses.

Two abstract test cases are defined for authorization requests, either for synchronous or asynchronous responses. In both test cases, the authorization request contains a SAML token in the WS-Security element of the SOAP header. This SAML token is obtained from a previous authentication request and is used to control access to services.

A final test case (to be split into more specific test cases when the present specification will be completed) is devoted to handing of request failure.

#### 1.2.1 ATC-3.1 Authorization with synchronous response

**Test case identifier**

“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:synchronous-authorization”

**Test assertion [purpose]**

Only an authorized client can access a requested protected service.

The service request header contains a SAML Token returned by a previous successful authentication request.
### Test method

Verify that the service to be invoked is protected, i.e. its WSDL specifies WS-Security policies.

The client issues a request containing a SAML token previously obtained through authentication.

Verify that the client is authorized to access the protected service, that is a successful response shall be returned.

### Reference

Clauses 7.3.2.

### Test type

Capability

#### 1.2.2 ATC-3.2 Authorization with asynchronous response

**NOTE:** This abstract test case is still under finalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:asynchronous-authorization”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test assertion [purpose]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only an authorized client can access a requested protected service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The service request header contains a SAML Token returned by a previous successful authentication request and WS-Addressing information to allow dispatching of the response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verify that the service to be invoked is protected, i.e. its WSDL specifies WS-Security policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The client issues a request containing a SAML token, previously obtained through authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Service Provider shall return a service response according to the following format:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The SOAP Header contains a SAML Token which authenticates the Service Provider, signed with the private key of the Service Provider and encrypted with the public key of the Federating Entity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The SOAP Body contains the actual response of the service.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pre-condition:**

The IUT shall support the asynchronous communication for the requested service.

### Reference

Clauses 7.3.3

### Test type

Capability

#### 1.2.3 ATC-3.3 Authorization request failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“urn:ogc:cite:ats:um:0.0.4:07-118r1:authorization-failure”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test assertion [purpose]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Test method             | The client issues a request containing a SAML token, previously signed and encrypted, but it is not authorized to access the protected service. Verify that a SOAP fault response is returned, such that:  
  • the `<faultstring>` element holds an “Authorization failure” [or equivalent] statement;  
  • the `<detail>` element holds application specific information about the reason of failure. |
| Reference               | Clause 7.2.3                                                                                                                                  |
| Test type               | Capability                                                                                                                                   |
Annex B: Schemas (Normative)

**authentication.xsd**

The following schema defines the types for authentication requests and responses.

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#
xmlns="http://earth.esa.int/um/tep"
targetNamespace="http://earth.esa.int/um/tep"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
    <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/xenc-schema.xsd"/>
    <xs:element name="authenticateResponse">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:sequence>
                <xs:element ref="xenc:EncryptedData" minOccurs="0"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
    <xs:element name="authenticate">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:sequence>
                <xs:element name="username" type="xs:string" nillable="true"/>
                <xs:element name="password" type="xs:string" nillable="true"/>
                <xs:element name="servername" type="xs:string" nillable="true" minOccurs="0"/>
            </xs:sequence>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
</xs:schema>
```

The `<xenc:EncryptedData>`, once decrypted, shall be a SAML 1.1 assertion, as defined in `oasis-sstc-saml-schema-assertion-1.1.xsd` (see below).

**oasis-sstc-saml-schema-assertion-1.1.xsd**

The schema for SAML assertions 1.1 is defined at the following URL:

Each service request may include, if required, the encrypted SAML token returned in the authentication response. In such situation, the SOAP header shall contain a <wsse:Security> element (WS-Security 1.1) having a <xenc:EncryptedData> (the SAML token) as child.

The schema defining the <wsse:Security> element is defined at the following URL:

http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd
Annex C: SOAP 1.1 Implementation (normative)

If SOAP 1.1 is used, only SOAP messaging (via HTTP/POST) with document/literal style shall be used. The expected SOAP action is:

http://earth.esa.int/um/eop#authenticate
Annex D: Example of SAML Token Attributes Specification
(Non-Normative)

The following subset of attributes necessary to implement the basic EO DAIL policy steps are proposed to be included in the SAML token:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAML Token attribute name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Id</td>
<td>Unambiguous federated identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProjectName</td>
<td>Names of projects with which user is affiliated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account</td>
<td>The account number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ServiceName</td>
<td>Associated services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ServiceName</td>
<td>Associated services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UserProfile</td>
<td>Type of user (Commercial/GMES/Scientific)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Attributes in SAML Token
Annex E: XACML Examples (Non-Normative)

Uses Case: restrict access for time period

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?
  <Subject>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>anonymous</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Subject>
  <Resource>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>WEB_Map_Server</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Resource>
  <Action>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>GetMap</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Action>
</Request>

Policy:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <PolicyDefaults>
    <XPathVersion>http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/Rec-xpath-19991116</XPathVersion>
  </PolicyDefaults>
  <Target>
<Resources>
    <Resource>
        <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
            <AttributeValue
                DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
                WEB_Map_Server</AttributeValue>
        </ResourceMatch>
    </Resource>
</Resources>

<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:ruleid:HL-IDM-480" Effect="Deny">
    <Description>
        User cannot access the service for getting maps in the time range 9:00 AM - 12:00 AM
    </Description>
    <Target>
        <Actions>
            <Action>
                <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
                    <AttributeValue
                        DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
                        GetMap</AttributeValue>
                </ActionMatch>
            </Action>
        </Actions>
        <Condition>
            <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:function:time-in-range">
                <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-one-and-only">
                    <EnvironmentAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:environment:current-time">
                        <AttributeValue
                            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#time">
                            09:00:00</AttributeValue>
                    </EnvironmentAttributeDesignator>
                </Apply>
            </Apply>
        </Condition>
    </Target>
</Rule>
Uses Case: enforce rules for specific group of users

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"

  <Subject>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>dail_user_1</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Subject>

  <Attribute AttributeId="urn:ogc:um:eop:0.0.4:saml:role" DataType="xs:string">
    <AttributeValue>guest</AttributeValue>
  </Attribute>

  <Resource>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>csw-ebrim_catalogue</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Resource>

  <Action>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>GetRecords</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Action>

</Request>
Policy:

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <PolicyDefaults />
  <XPathVersion>http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/Rec-xpath-19991116</XPathVersion>
  <Target>
    <Resources>
      <Resource>
        <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">csw-ebrim_catalogue</AttributeValue>
        </ResourceMatch>
      </Resource>
    </Resources>
  </Target>
  <Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:ruleid:HL-IDM-490" Effect="Deny">
    <Description>
      User with "guest" role cannot access the service in the time range 9:00 AM - 12:00 AM
    </Description>
    <Target>
      <Subjects>
        <Subject>
          <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
            <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">guest</AttributeValue>
          </SubjectMatch>
        </Subject>
      </Subjects>
    </Target>
  </Rule>
</Policy>
```
Uses Case: restrict access to the type of data

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"
  <Subject>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>dail_user_1</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:ogc:um:eop:0.0.4:saml:role" DataType="xs:string">
      <AttributeValue>guest</AttributeValue>
    </Attribute>
  </Subject>
  <Resource>
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="xs:string">
    </Attribute>
  </Resource>
</Request>
Policy:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

  <PolicyDefaults>
    <XPathVersion>http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/Rec-xpath-19991116</XPathVersion>
  </PolicyDefaults>
  <Target>
    <Resources>
      <Resource>
        <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
            csw-ebrim_catalogue
          </AttributeValue>
          <ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
        </ResourceMatch>
      </Resource>
    </Resources>
  </Target>
  <Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:ruleid:HL-IDM-500" Effect="Deny">
    <Description>
      User with the "guest" role cannot access high-resolution data
    </Description>
  </Rule>
</Policy>
Uses Case: restricting access to users from certain geographic locations

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:context:schema:os"
  <Subject>
    ...
  </Subject>
</Request>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id" DataType="xs:string">
  <AttributeValue>dail_user_1</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

<Attribute AttributeId="urn:ogc:um:eop:0.0.4:saml:country" DataType="xs:string">
  <AttributeValue>France</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" DataType="xs:string">
  <AttributeValue>csw-ebrim_catalogue</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" DataType="xs:string">
  <AttributeValue>GetRecords</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>

Policy:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <PolicyDefaults/>
  <XPathVersion>http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/Rec-xpath-19991116</XPathVersion>
  <PolicyDefaults/>
  <Target/>
  <Resources/>
  <Resource/>
  <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
      csw-ebrim_catalogue
    </AttributeValue>
  </ResourceMatch>
</Policy>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:resource:resource-id"
    DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
</Target>
    <Description>
        User from the "France" country cannot access the service
    </Description>
    <Target>
        <Subjects>
            <Subject>
                <SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
                    <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">France</AttributeValue>
                </SubjectMatch>
            </Subject>
        </Subjects>
    </Target>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Annex F: Example of WSDL using WS-Policy (Non-Normative)

-To be completed-